

















Recent forecasts of electric-power demand
and supply in the Pacific Northwest suggest the
possibility of serious shortages during the dec-
ade of the 1980's. The projected imbalance
reflectstheinefficientpricingpolicies prescribed
by law and regulatory commissions for the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and
other regional electric utilities.
1 Bonneville is
the wholesale marketing agency for hydroelec-
tric power generated at some 30 Federal dams
along the Columbia River and for some pur-
chased thermal (coal and nuclear) power sup-
plies. Indeed, BPA is the wholesale supplier of
over one-half of the total electricity consumed
in the Pacific Northwest. Thus, its pricing prac-
tices profoundly influence the general level of
electric rates faced by ultimate consumers in
that region.
A conflict over BPA supplies has developed
among Bonneville's various customer groups,
with private utilities being denied contracts for
firm Federal power-assured supplies-since
the early 1970's. This reflects the agency's at-
tempts to assure the needs of its statutory pref-
erence customers-the publicly-owned retail
power agencies that have first priority for Fed-
erally-generated wholesale power. Private util-
ities have had to make up for that loss as well
as meet the growth of demand on their own,
generally from more expensive thermal sup-
plies. The consequence is a wide disparity in
retail rates to ultimate consumers served by
the two classes of utilities. In recent months,
Bonneville's industrial customers have suf-
fered a loss of that portion of their contracted
"Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Den-
nis Barton provided research assistance for this article.
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supplies subject to interruption. Moreover,
these customers face a possible cutoff of all
Federal supplies when their contracts expire in
1983. The industries involved employ about
15,000 persons with an annual payroll ofabout
$355 million, and supply 30 percent of the na-
tion's primary aluminum, 100 percent of its
ferronickel, and substantial quantities of other
key materials.
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plan-
ning and Conservation Act, which has been
introduced into Congress to deal with the al-
location problem, would rely on new institu-
tional arrangements to balance demand and
supply. But by failing to address the funda-
mental cause of the disequilibrium-namely,
the present inefficient pricing policies followed
by Bonneville and other regional utilities-it
is unlikely to provide a permanent solution to
the region's electrical-supply problems.
In this article, we argue that Bonneville
should base its power rates not on average cost
but rather on long-run incremental cost. The
former is total cost divided by the number of
units to be sold; the latter is the cost of pro-
ducing additional electricity, taking into ac-
count the need to add more fixed factors,
namely plant facilities. Long-run incremental
cost approximates the cost of electricity pro-
duced from new plant. This pricing approach
would result in a more efficient allocation of
resources, because rates would reflect the true
cost ofthe resources expended to provide con-
sumers with each additional block of power. It
would significantly lower the future demand
for Bonneville power because its price would
be much higher than under the current aver-
age-cost pricing method. As a result, substan-tially less new generating capacity would be
required than is currently forecast.
Section I discusses the economic-efficiency
argument for pricing on the basis of long-run
incremental cost. As noted there, electric util-
ities traditionally have not followed that
method because their operations presumably
have been characterized by decreasing long-
run average and incremental costs due to econ-
omies of scale. Under such conditions, pricing
on the basis of incremental cost would fail to
recover average cost, resulting in a loss. But
as Section II indicates, this long-run incremen-
tal cost in actuality is far higher than the av-
erage cost reported by Bonneville. In Section
III, we attribute part of the gap between the
two to present average-cost accounting meth-
ods, but also to rising long-run incremental
costs resulting from the exhaustion of econ-
omies of scale. Section IV discusses some of
the sub-optimal long-run incremental cost pric-
ing methods that have been proposed to avoid
surplus revenues, and argues that true long-
run incremental cost pricing is preferable.
It is important to note that while Bonne-
ville's pricing policies have been singled out
for study in this article, the arguments ad-
vanced in favor ofincremental-cost pricing ap-
ply to the entire electric-utility industry. To
various degrees, the wide-spread use of aver-
age-cost pricing methods is holding electric-
utility rates everywhere below those that
would prevail under long-run incremental-cost
pricing, spurring the growth of electrical con-
sumption and causing too many resources to
be devoted to power generation.
I. Rationale for Different Pricing Methods
Bonneville Power Administration-like other show how a firm's costs will vary in response
electric utilities throughout the nation-tradi- to variations in output within the limits of a
tionally has followed an average-cost pricing given amount of fixed plant. Long-run cost
method for establishing the level of its power calculations show how costs will vary during a
rates.
2 Under this method, the utility first de- planning period long enough to permit adjust-
termines its revenue requirement. This refers ment of the scale of productive facilities.
to the total costs that must be recovered Electric-power rate decisions thus depend
through rates during a given period to com- upon whether or not the scale ofplant is to be
pensate the utility for all the expenses incurred increased. Ifnew plant is scheduled during the
in supplying the product, including a return on planning period encompassed in the rate cal-
invested capital.
3 Under present statutes, total culation, long-run incremental (marginal) cost
revenues must exactly equal total costs, a re- is the appropriate basis for pricing, i.e., price
quirement known as the budgetary constraint. per unit should be equal to long-run incremen-
Dividing total costs by the number of units tal cost.
4 Long-run incremental cost equals the
expected to be sold in a given period yields cost ofelectricity produced from the next block
the average unit cost-and thus the price-Df of new generating facilities scheduled to be
electricity. added. Under that pricing method, the price
Economic theory demonstrates that the per unit thus reflects only the cost of electricity
price per unit should be equal not to average produced from new productive facilities-in
cost but to marginal cost. Marginal cost is the contrast to average cost pricing, which also
change in total cost resulting from an addi- reflects the cost of electricity from older facili-
tional unit of output-that is, the cost of pro- ties.
ducing one more unit of a good or service, or The rationale for pricing on the basis of in-
alternatively, the cost that would be saved by cremental cost is simply efficiency. A funda-
producing one less unit. mental precept of economics states that opti-
In economic theory, the distinction between mum welfare and efficiency are achieved under
short and long-run is based on whether or not conditions ofperfectly competitive markets. A
plant size is fixed. Short-run cost calculations perfectly competitive firm, which by definition
41has no control over the price of its product,
maximizes profits by selecting an output level
where the price of its good or service equals
its marginal cost. Under such conditions, re-
sources would be channelled into their most
efficient uses.
5 This is because each price
wouldreflect thevalueofthe resources required
to supply each particular good or service, and
because consumers therefore would be pro-
vided with the proper price signals to make
the choices that would yield society the most
efficient use of resources. If price were less
than marginal cost, consumers would be in-
duced to consume an additional unit, even if
the benefits were less than the marginal com-
mitment of society's resources to produce that
unit.
Equality of price and marginal cost leads to
optimal welfare and efficiency only if it applies
to all goods and services throughout the econ-
omy. Pricing as many goods as possible at mar-
ginal cost does not necessarily provide a "sec-
ond best" solution. It might actually make
allocation less efficient, particularly in situa-
tions where close substitutes are priced above
or below marginal cost. But while this problem
complicates the application of marginal-cost
pricing, it does not necessarily invalidate its
use in particular situations. Care simply must
be taken to consider the ramifications on both
the market in question and the markets of
other close substitutes and complementary
products.
In the Pacific Northwest situation, electric
power is being priced far below marginal cost,
whereas close substitutes such as oil and nat-
ural gas are being priced closer to marginal
cost. Given the relatively high cost of substi-
tutes, adoption of long-run incremental-cost
pricing by electric utilities probably would lead
to a reduction in overall energy use rather than
a shift to alternate fuels.
Dilemma of incremental pricing
The goal ofthe regulatory authorities should
be to price as close to the perfectlycompetitive
model as possible. Why then haven't they done
so? The reason is the regulators' assumption
that electricity generation involves decreasing
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long-run average costs over the output range
relevant to a given market. Decreasing long-
run costs are the result of increasing returns to
scale. These economies of scale, in the regu-
latory context, refer to a situation in which
unit production costs decline for the individual
firm as the size of its plant is increased. The
economies are internal to the operation of the
individual firm, in contrast to external econ-
omies which arise out of the growth of the
entire industry.6
"Plant" in this context may consist of a sin-
gle production facility ora group of production
facilities comprising a system. In e1ectric-
power generation, regulators assume that the
size of plant required to achieve lowest unit
cost is so large that it justifies only one firm
for any given market. Because ofthis assumed
inherent tendency to decreasing long-run av-
erage cost over the relevant output range, the
electric-generating industry traditionally has
been characterized as a "natural monopoly."
To enable consumers to benefit from theseBackground on Bonneville
Functions
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) was created by Congress in 1937 to market and
transmit electric power from the Federally-owned Bonneville Dam. The agency's authority
subsequently has been expanded to include the marketing of hydroelectric power from other
Federal dams since constructed in the Pacific Northwest. As of the end of 1978, there were
30 Federal dams with an installed capacity of 16,441 megawatts under Bonneville's marketing
authority (Figure 1).
BPA does not build dams or generating plants, but serves instead as a marketing agency
for power generated at Federal facilities built and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation. The agency, however, is responsible for designing
and constructing the vast transmission network required to supply its market area. That area
consists of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Western Montana, plus small portions of adjacent
states. The Federal power facilities in the Pacific Northwest, together with the transmission
system, are known collectively as the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS).
Role in hydro-thermal development
Until the 1960's, the Pacific Northwest depended on hydro-electric generation to meet
nearly all of the region's electrical requirements. But by that time, most of the economically
and environmentally feasible damsites had been developed, and it then became evident that
thermal plants would have to be added to meet the growth of regional electrical requirements.
As a result, BPA and over one hundred public and privately-owned utilities entered into an
agreement-known as the Hydro-Thermal Program-to meet the projected growth of de-
mand over the 1970-90 period. Under this program, the Federal government agreed to
develop the remaining hydro-electric power potential of existing dams to meet the growth of
peak demands. The government also agreed to construct the necessary high-voltage trans-
mission lines to accommodate the growth in regional power deliveries. Non-Federal utilities
in the region agreed to build and operate numerous new thermal (coal and nuclear) operating
plants to meet the growth of baseload (steady) energy requirements. Thermal construction
lagged during the 1970's, contributing to power "shortages," and Bonneville purchased small
but increasing amounts of thermal power from non-Federal utilities.
Contribution to Pacific Northwest electric supplies
In fiscal 1978, BPA supplied about 87 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, equivalent to
about 54 percent of the total electric power generated in the Pacific Northwest. Private
investor-owned utilities generated another 26 percent, while non-Federal publicly-owned
utilities produced the remaining 20 percent.
BPA's customers
Bonneville Power Administration is a wholesale supplier of electricity. The agency's cus-
tomer groups consist of publicly-owned utilities, private investor-owned utilities and direct-
service industries. Under existing law, publicly-owned utilities-i.e., utilities owned by public
entities such as municipalities, cooperatives and public utility districts-have preference or
priority in the purchase of Federal power. Since the early 1970's, BPA has denied private
investor-owned utilities access to all but small amounts of "firm" power-assured contract
supplies-to enable Bonneville to meet the requirements of its preference customers.
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Pacific Northwest Electric Generating Capacity and Output, 1978
Capaclty1 output
No. of Percent BIllions of Percent
Ownership Plants Megawatts of Total Kllowatt·Hours of Total
Federal Columbia River Power
87.02 System 30 16,442 48.7 54.2
Hydro (30) (16,442) (48.7)
Non-Federal PUblicly-Owned
Utilities 52 7,954 23.6 31.5 19.7
Hydro (39) (6,217) (18.4)
Thermal (13) (1,735) (5.1)
Privately-Owned Utilities 106 9,332 27.7 41.9 26.1
Hydro (88) (4,020) (11.9)
Thermal (18) (5,312) (15.8)
All Owners 188 33,728 100.0 160.4 100.0
Hydro (157) (26,679) (79.1)
Thermal (31) (7,047) (20.9)
Name-plate rating as of December 31, 1978; actual capability is about 12 percent higher on average than name-plate
rating.
2 Includes power purchased from the Hanford and Trojan nuclear plants and the Centralia coal-fired plant owned bynon-
Federal utilities.
Source: Bonneville Power Administration, Financial and Statistical Summary (Fiscal year 1978), page 6, plus information
supplied directly by agency.
44economies ofscale, governments have granted
private firms exclusive franchises to serve
given market areas, or have assumed direct
public ownership of generation and transmis-
sion facilities. At the same time, governments
have regulated utility rates to prevent the ex-
traction of monopoly profits (Appendix A).
But this assumed tendency to decreasing
long-run average cost also has provided the
rationale for pricing on the basis of average
cost. Under such conditions, if rates were to
be established on the basis of long-run incre-
mental cost, average cost would not be re-
covered, and the result would be an operating
loss.
Chart 1 illustrates the concept of economies
of scale as it applies to the individual firm.
Here plant size is not fixed, and the compari-
son is between average production costs of
plants of various capacity. Economies of scale
in the electric-power industry refer to the fact
that relatively larger generation and transmis-
sion systems have lower unit costs than rela-
tively smaller systems. The concept is defined
for a particular point in time, which means a
given state of technology.7 Economies of scale
would exist if, say, the cost per kilowatt-hour
associated with a 10,000 megawatt generating
system were lower than the average produc-
tion costs associated with a 7,500 megawatt
system, with both alternatives being consid-
ered within the same planning period.
In Chart 1, the long-run average cost curve
(LRAC) envelops a family of short-run cost
curves, each short-run curve (SRAC) corre-
sponding to a different plant scale. Each point
on the LRAC curve, being a point oftangency
with a SRAC curve, represents the least cost
at which a given level of output can be
achieved. The firm experiences increasing re-
turns to scale-that is, lower average unit costs
for plants ofincreased size-up to output level
Q3 corresponding to SRAC3, after which dis-
economies serve to increase unit costs.
Chart 1
Decreasing Long-Run Cost Curve






45Chart 2-A shows the pricing alternatives fac-
ing regulatory authorities in a situation where
the utility is operating in a range ofdecreasing
long-run average costs. To achieve the most
efficient allocation of resources possible under
regulated-monopoly conditions, the regulatory
authorities would have to mandate incremen-
tal-cost pricing. Under that method, the legal
(ceiling) price (Pic) would be determined by
the cost of production of the last unit, that is,
by the intersection ofthe demand schedule (0)
and the long-run incremental-cost curve
(LRIC). But setting the unit price at Pic would
generate losses for the regulated firm under
conditions of decreasing long-run average
costs, in that the cost of the last unit ofoutput
would be less than the average cost per unit.
These losses would be represented by the area,
(PI - Pic) x Qic.
To avoid the necessity for public subsidies to
offset these losses, rate-setting commissions
have followed an average-cost pricing method,
incorporating in the average cost a rate of re-
turn on invested capital. Under this method,
the maximum price per unit is set at (Pac), the
intersection of the demand schedule (0) and
the long-run average cost curve (LRAC). Un-
der conditions of decreasing long-run average
cost, this method of pricing results in a higher
unit price and lower level of output than the
more efficient long-run incremental cost
method. This is because long-run average cost
is above long-run incremental cost under such
conditions.
Chart 2-B illustrates the price and output
combinations that would result under alterna-
tive pricing methods if the utility were oper-
ating in a range of increasing long-run average
Chart 2
Pricing Alternatives in a Regulated Monopoly Situation
B. Increasing Long-Run Costs
Over Relevant Output Range
Price and Cost
Per Unit
A. Decreasing Long-Run Costs




46costs. Under such conditions, pricing on the
basis of long-run incremental cost results in a
price (Pic) and output level (Oic). That price
would yield a profit beyond the return incor-
porated in average cost, in that the cost of the
last unit of output would be more than the
average cost per unit. The excess profit would
be represented by the area, (Pic - PI) x Oic.
To avoid excess profits, regulators might prefer
to follow the average-cost method, which
would result in price (Pac) and output level
(Qac). But average-cost pricing under condi-
tions of increasing long-run average costs, re-
sults in an under-pricing of the product and a
correspondingly greater and uneconomic
amount of resources devoted to its production.
II. Bonneville's Long-Run Incremental Cost
The Pacific Northwest's electric-power sys- been purchasing increased amounts of thermal
tern currently relies primarily on hydro-electric power from other publicly-owned utilities for
generation. But thermal (coal and nuclear) transmission over Federal lines. In addition,
plants will have to provide most of the new Bonneville has been adding new hydro gen-
energy or baseload requirements of regional erating capacity at existing Federal dams to
consumers, i.e., electricity which is required meet the peaks in demand that exceed its
on a steady basis. This is because the region steady baseload requirements. To estimate the
contains few undeveloped dam sites. However, agency's overall long-run incremental cost of
Congress has not authorized any Federally- power, it is therefore necessary to include es-
built coal or nuclear plants in the region. In- timates of the cost of both new thermal base-
stead, under the Hydro-Thermal Program un- load and hydro-peaking facilities.
derway since the late 1960's, Bonneville has In micro-economic theory, the concept of
Table 1
Incremental Baseload Capacity and Cost, Washington Public Power Supply System,
Nuclear Plants 1, 2, and 3





Year Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Annual
4 Cumulative FactorS Annual Cost Output
1982 1,l00 1,100 7,227 7,227 188.3 188.3 834 157.0 6,027
1983 1,100 7.227 188.3 .762 143.5 5,507
1984 1,250 2,350 8,213 15,440 234.1 422.4 .696 294.0 10,746
1985 2,350 15,440 422.4 .635 268.2 9,804
1986 868 3,218 5,703 21,143 159.9 582.3 .580 337.7 12,263
Total: 1,200.4 38,326
Incremental Unit Cost = (I present value total cost)/(I present value kwh generation) = 1,200.4/38,326 =
3.13 cents/kwh
1 Net to Bonneville Power Administration, in megawatts.
2 In millions of kilowatt hours. Based on annual capacity factor (operating rate) of 75 percent. Annual output
capacity x factor x hours in year (8,760).
3 In millions of dollars. Levelizing reduces a stream of unequal future costs over a period n to a series of n equal
payments. (See Appendix B, Table 1).
4 Total costs (both fixed and variable).
5 Assumes a discount rate of 9.5 percent; discounted to 1980.
6 Annual cost in millions of dollars. Output in millions of kilowatt hours.
Source: Computed by the author on the basis of output and cost data provided by Bonneville Power Administration.
47long-run has no specific time dimension. But
in applying theory to rate determination, the
utility is faced with the problem of defining the
long-run. The length ofthat period determines
the amount of new generating capacity to be
included in the estimate of long-run incremen-
tal cost, and thus the amount of total revenues
to be received. For relative stability in rates,
the period selected should be long enough to
prevent frequent rate changes.
Fortunately, it is not difficult to delineate the
next well-defined block of baseload energy to
be acquired by Bonneville. The agency has
contracted with the Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS) to purchase nearly all
of the output from three nuclear plants sched-
uled for completion over the 1982-86 period.
We have defined that block as the next base-
load increment, and have developed an esti-
mate of the consequent long-run incremental
cost of energy, discounted back to the year
1980 (Table 1).
Long-run incremental cost per kilowatt-hour
may be defined for computational purposes as
the present value of all future costs associated
with the output from scheduled additions to
capacity, divided by the present value of that
incremental output.
8 Long-run incremental
unit cost thus can be estimated by determining:
1) the scheduled additions to capacity and re-
sultant output over the planning horizon, 2)
totallevelized annual costs, fixed and variable,
associated with that output, and 3) the present
value of these costs and additions to output.
"Levelizing" is a method for reducing a
stream of unequal future costs over a given
period to a series of equal costs. It eliminates
the year-to-year fluctuations in costs to provide
a more representative figure of the annual
costs and revenues required to produce that
increment of output. Application of that pro-
cedure to WPPSS nuclear-plant costs is shown
in Appendix B, Table 1. The present-value
calculation converts expected costs to their
present value today. In the present case, we
discount to the year 1980 at a 9.S-percent rate,
in keeping with the practice of some of the
investor-owned utilities in the region. Thus,
we estimate the long-run incremental cost of
power produced from these three nuclear
plants at about 3.13 cents/kwh.
Power from the new hydro-peaking facilities
will cost much less per kilowatt hour. But be-
cause thermal plants will account for the bulk
of the new generation capability, the overall
incremental unit cost of electricity still will ap-
proximate 3 cents/kwh.
9 This compares with
the average cost of .412 cents/kwh recovered
by Bonneville in 1979.
Bonneville's efficiency would improve if it
priced its total power supplies on the basis of
incremental cost. (This would require
Congressional authorization, however.) In
planning rates for any given future period,
Bonneville would set the unit price equal to
the long-run incremental cost of the appropri-
ate block of scheduled capacity. If it did so,
regulatory commissions might follow suit and
encourage Bonneville's utility customers to
make a similar switchover to long-run incre-
mental cost pricing, thereby providing retail
electricity customers with the price signals re-
quired to allocate available supplies more ef-
ficiently. In contrast, under BPA's present av-
erage-cost pricing method, the cost of the last
and more expensive increment would be com-
bined with the costs associated with the older
facilities, so that wholesale and retail cus-
tomers would not be aware of the economic
value of the resources required to supply ad-
ditional increments. Consequently, too many
resources would be devoted to the production
of electricity.
III. Differential Between Long-Run Incremental and Ave[age Cost
As we have seen, the estimated long-run the agency's total costs. Several factors help
incremental cost of power to be acquired by explain this wide differential between esti-
Bonneville far exceeds its latest reported av- mated long-run incremental and reported av-
erage-cost figure. Consequently, it seems erage cost. First, Bonneville, in interpreting
doubtful that the introduction of long-run in- the laws governing its selling price, has failed
eremental cost pricing would fail to recover to recover the true average costs-i.e., oppor-
48tunity costs-actually incurred by the Federal
government in producing, purchasing and
transmitting electricity. Second, the average-
cost methodology employed by the electric-
utility-industry in general fails to fully reflect
inflation, because it determines capital charges
on an original-cost basis, whereas long-run in-
cremental cost reflects the present value of the
future inflated costs associated with additional
new plant. Third, the economies of scale as-
sociated with the Federal Columbia River
Power System have been exhausted with re-
gard to baseload generation, raising incremen-
tal cost in a static sense above average cost.
Understated average costs
Bonneville is required by law to set whole-
sale power rates so as to produce sufficient
revenues to recover the cost to the Federal
government of producing, purchasing and
transmitting electricity.1O Evidence suggests,
however, that the agency has not been recover-
ing its true total and average costs, because it
is also required to set power rates sufficiently
low "to encourage widespread use of electric
energy and provide the lowest possible rates
to consumers consistent with sound business
principles. ,,11
For more efficient resource allocation,
Bonneville power rates should be based on
long-run incremental rather than average-cost
pricing methods. But if the latter method must
be employed, the revenue requirement should
be determined on the same basis as it is in the
private-utility sector. That would call for an
"opportunity-cost" approach-one that would
assure the general taxpayer a rate of return on
invested capital equal to that earned on aver-
age in the private-utility sector were invest-
ment there to be financed solely through long-
term debt. This assumes little difference in risk
between the Federal and private-utility sec-
tors, since the latter is regulated to ensure a
reasonable rate of return.
To show Bonneville's underestimation ofthe
actual economic costs incurred by the Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) over
the 1947-79 period, the author re-estimated
average unit costs incurred by that system on




ments included the addition of imputed prop-
erty and income taxes, as well as the
recalculation of interest charges and amorti-
zation on Congressional appropriations for
FCRPS investments. Other FCRPS costs were
accepted as measured by Bonneville. Appen-
dix C contains the computations, plus technical
notes.
Taxes: Bonneville pays no taxes--otherthan
payroll taxes-to Federal, state or local gov-
ernments. In contrast, private utilities over the
1947-79 period paid annual property taxes av-
eraging about 2.3 percent of their total invest-
ment in plant, and income taxes averaging
about 9.0 percent of their operating revenues.
Addition of imputed property and income-tax
costs of that magnitude thus would have raised
the total unit cost (and price) of FCRPS elec-
tricity by 1979 to .606 cents per kilowatt hour
(Table 2). This represents a 47-percent in-
crease over Bonneville's reported cost of .412
cents per kilowatt hour (Table 3).
Interest: Over the 1937-77 period, the inter-
est rates on BPA borrowings ranged from 2V2
to 6Vs percent, with 3V4 percent being the 1977
weighted average for all debt outstanding. 13
These interest rates appear to be inordi-
nately low, however. Some critics claim that
the appropriate interest rate to be applied to
those Congressional appropriations should be
the prevailing average yield on long-term
Treasury bonds at the time the debt is in-
curred.
14 But the author would go even further
and use the average rate paid by private elec-
tric utilities for new long-term borrowings in
the bond market. The author contends, in
other words, that the appropriate comparison
should be between the Federal and private
utility sectors, and not between the Federal
utility sector and the Federal government sec-
tor in general. On that basis, the public would
earn as great a return on funds invested in the
Federal utility sector as it could earn from pur-
chasing private-utility bonds. Over the 1947-
79 period, the interest payments that should
have been recovered through rates imputed on
this basis would have raised the average unit
cost for Bonneville-marketed power to .831cents/kwh by 1979 (Table 2)-102percent more
than the cost and corresponding price actually
calculated by Bonneville (Table 3).
Amortization: Bonneville is required by law
to repay each dollar borrowed for investment
in Federal generating projects within 50 years
after the project becomes revenue producing,
and each dollar investment in transmission
equipment within 40 years after those facilities
are placed in service. However, the agency has
not repaid such borrowings on a systematic
basis, as it would if it were operating as a
private utility with a given depreciation sched-
ule. In fact, BPA has set its rates so low that
it was unable to pay anything back to the
Treasury in the past three years, but instead
only increased its outstanding debt.
With adjustments made for imputed taxes,
interest and amortization costs, the Federal
Columbia River Power System actually in-
curred an average unit cost of at least 1.018
cents/kwh in 1979 instead ofthe .412 cents/kwh
actually reported. Had rates been raised to
reflect true average costs, the price for Bonne-
ville power in 1979 would have been 147 per-
cent higher than the amount actually charged
Table 2
Reconciliation of Reported and Imputed Unit Cost, Federal Columbia River Power
System, 1947-79
(cents per kilowatt hour)
Plus Imputed Cost Differential Constant Dollar
Unit Cost1 Cumulatively Added2 Unit Cost6
Unit Cost As Wholesale
Fiscal As Reported Net Net Imputed By Price As As
Year By Bonneville + Taxes + Interest + Amortization3 Author4 Index5 Reported Imputed
1947 .265 .356 .360 .289 .289 37.81 .701 .765
1949 .232 .315 .327 .247 .247 43.22 .538 .572
1951 .240 .337 366 .274 .274 46.93 .511 .584
1953 .238 .340 .373 .330 .330 46.44 .512 .711
1955 .238 .360 .403 .382 .382 46.30 .514 .826
1957 .235 .353 .390 .383 .383 48.85 .481 .784
1959 .239 .375 .413 .445 .445 50.20 .476 .888
1961 .247 .393 .431 .488 .488 50.20 .491 .972
1963 .247 .463 .503 .550 .550 50.12 .493 1.097
1965 .242 .374 .409 .432 .432 50.50 .480 .855
1967 .256 .377 .415 .412 .412 52.98 .484 .778
1969 .265 .395 .486 .489 .489 53.23 .479 886
1971 .270 .402 .524 .561 .561 59.35 .455 .945
1973 .273 .394 .512 .604 .604 66.41 .411 .910
1975 .361 .519 721 .762 .762 90.16 .400 .845
1977 .362 .557 .838 1.027 1.027 lOO.OO .362 1.025
1979 .412 .606 831 U1l8 U1l8 120.61 .497 1.228
I Derived on the basis of average-cost pricing method. For derivation see Appendix C, Table 1.
2 For derivation of the various imputed-cost components, see Appendix C, Table 2. The differentials between the various
imputed- and reported-cost components were derived. and then added to (or subtracted from) total unit costs (as reported
by Bonneville) on a cumulative basis.
3 From 1947-57, Bonneville repaid more of its borrowings than would have been called for under the author's imputed-
amortization schedule. Imputed amortization was less than the amount actually recovered, and thus reduced the unit
cost.
4 Derived on the basis of average-cost pricing method. For derivation see Appendix C, technical notes and Table 2.
5 Fiscal year 1977 = 100.
6 Cents per kilowatt hour, in constant 1977 dollars.
50(Table 3). As reported by Bonneville, the av-
erage cost of power remained virtually con-
stant over the entire 1947-67 period, as sales
rose from 8.3 to 51.9 billion kilowatt hours,
but then began to increase in 1969-79 as sales
rose from 51.8 to 72.0 billion kilowatt hours.
On an imputed basis, in contrast, the average
cost rose almost without interruption through-
out the entire period, with the rate of increase
accelerating during the sales expansion of the
1970's (Chart 3). In constant dollars, unit costs
as reported by Bonneville trended downward
over time, whereas imputed costs in real terms
trended upward (Chart 4).
Low Federal power rates undoubtedly
helped contribute to the periodic electrical
shortages of the 1970's. During the 1947-70
period, with virtually stable BPA rates, the
Pacific Northwest's electric-power consump-
tion rose at a 7V2-percent annual rate. In con-
trast, consumption growth slowed to a 31/z-per-
cent annual rate over the 1970-77 period as a
result of the 1974-75 recession and supply
problems-as well as rising rates. But during
the past two years the growth rate accelerated
once again. As a result, the region's per capita
electrical-energy consumption continued to be
almost double the national average.
Impact of inflation
The average-cost figure of 1.02 cents/kwh,
as calculated here on an opportunity-cost ba-
sis, is still less than one-third as large as the
estimated long-run incremental cost of 3.13
cents/kwh. Part, if not all, of this differential
may be due to the failure of the utility indus-
try'saverage-costmethodologyto reflectthefull
effects of inflation.
The electric utility industry (including
Bonneville) determines the capital costs to be
recovered through revenues on the basis ofthe
historical (original) cost of plant and equip-
ment. These capital charges include such items
as depreciation, interest, and property taxes.
But during periods of rapid inflation, when ris-
ing prices push the cost of new equipment far
beyond the original cost ofequipment acquired
in the past, the average-cost procedure yields
much lower figures than the long-run incre-
mental-cost procedure, which includes dis-
counted future capital costs. In particular, if





















Imputed Unit Cost as a Percent of Reported Unit Cost
Unit Cost Plus Imputed Cost Differentials, Cumulatively Added
as Reported Net Net
by Bonneville + Taxes + Interest + Amortization'
100.0 134.3 135.8 109.1
100.0 135.8 140.9 106.5
100.0 140.4 152.5 114.2
100.0 142.9 156.7 138.7
100.0 151.3 169.3 160.5
100.0 150.2 166.0 163.0
100.0 156.9 172.8 186.2
100.0 159.1 174.5 197.6
100.0 187.4 203.6 222.7
lOO.O 154.5 169.0 178.5
lOO.O 147.3 162.1 160.9
100.0 149.1 183.4 184.5
lOO.O 148.9 194.1 207.8
100.0 144.3 187.5 221.2
100.0 143.8 199.4 211.1
100.0 156.6 231.8 283.7
100.0 147.1 201.7 247.1
From 1947-57, Bonneville repaid more of its borrowings than would have been called for under the author's imputed-
amortization schedule. Imputed amortization was therefore less than the amount actually recovered, and thus reduced
the unit cost.
51sis, the average-cost method overestimates the
loss of value in the early life of the plant. An
annual-average depreciation charge for plant
and equipment of various ages calculated on
an historic-cost basis bears no relation to cur-
rent value. Similarly, interest rates used in cal-
culating average cost are historic rates,
whereas the incremental-cost procedure in-
cludes both current and future rates for long-
term bond financing of scheduled plant and
equipment.15
Decreasing returns to scale?
The above discussion relates to the behavior
of costs over time. In contrast, the theoretical
concepts of decreasing returns to scale and
increasing long-run average cost depict cost
and output alternatives facing a firm at a mo-
mentoftime under the assumption of constant
technology and factor prices (Chart 2-B). The
average-cost concept as defined in economic
theory is a statement ofhow average costs vary
for systems of varied scale built today. A firm
would be operating in an output range asso-
ciated with increasing long-run average costs
if expansion to a larger scale plant (or system)
built from scratch today entailed higher aver-
age costs than a smaller plant built today.












































Federal Columbia River Power System Costs,
As Reported And On
An Imputed Private-Utility Cost Basis, Biennially 1947-79
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2 Determined on the basis of the average-cost pricing method. Under that method, total costs are divided by the number
of units sold in a given period to obtain the unit cost and therefore the average price of electricity.
3 Sales equal the amount of power generated in a given period (output) minus transmission and other losses.
Source: See Appendix C, Tables 1 and 2.
52bia River Power System may be facing increas-
ing long-run average costs due to the exhaus-
tion of economies of scale in baseload
generation. Bonneville's decision to purchase
thermal power rather than to develop the hy-
droelectric potential of the system to meet
baseload growth suggests the exhaustion of
such economies of scale. That is, even if the
system were rebuilt from scratch today, long-
run incremental cost might be higher than av-
erage cost. Some evidence also suggests that
economies of scale for nuclear power at the
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2 Determined on the basis of the average-cost pricing method. Under that methoq, total costs are divided by the number
of units sold in a given period to obtain the unit cost and therefore the average price of electricity.
3 Sales equal the amount of power generated in a given period (output) minus transmission and other losses.
Source: Table 2, developed from data shown in Appendix C, Tables 1 and 2.
53IV. Strict Incremental or Sub-Optimal Incremental Pricing?
Whatever the reasons, Bonneville faces a
situation where its long-run incremental cost
is higher than its calculated current average
cost. Strict application of long-run incremen-
tal-cost pricing would conflict with the agency's
statutory requirement that total revenues
equal total costs. One possible solution would
be to utilize a sub-optimal approach to incre-
mental-cost pricing known as the inverse-elas-
ticity rule (IER), which involves price discrim-
ination among customer groups with different
price elasticities of demand. Under this
method, prices charged certain customer
groups closely approximate incremental cost,
while prices charged other customers may be
higher or lower than incremental cost, de-
pending on the relationship ofincremental and
average cost.
Bonneville's current incremental cost is
higher than its reported average cost. In this
case, the proper approach would be to charge
customers with higher price elasticities of de-
mand higher rates, i.e., rates closer to incre-
mental cost. Revenues from such customers
would tend to decrease (as their demand is
price elastic), lowering total revenues. Using
the inverse-elasticity rule, customers with
more elastic demand would be charged incre-
mental cost, while customers with less elastic
demand would be charged prices closer to av-
erage cost. The objective is to charge prices
approximating long-run incremental cost to as
many customers as possible.
The customer groups that ultimately deter-
mine the quantity of electricity demand in a
region are the end-users, namely the residen-
tial, commercial and industrial customers.
Therefore, in order to implement the inverse-
elasticity rule, Bonneville would have to esti-
mate the price elasticities of demand of these
customer groups.I?
Elimination of the legal budgetary restric-
tions on the use of long-run incremental cost
pricing would remove the difficult practical
problem of estimating these elasticities, and
would also remove the need to discriminate
among customer groups.I8 The price per unit
for sales to all customer groups could then be
set equal to long-run incremental cost, which
54
would represent the most efficient way of al-
locating scarce resources.
Recent studies of the demand for electric
power suggest that residential and commercial
demand are price elastic, both over short- and
long-term periods.I9 Since these groups con-
sume about 60 percent of the Pacific North-
west's total electricity, sharply higher prices
probably would reduce projected consumption
significantly. A large number of the twelve nu-
clear and coal-fired generating plants sched-
uled for completion during the 1980's thus
would not be needed.
Surplus funds collected by Bonneville either
could be returned to the U.S. Treasury or
could be used to finance conservation projects
or research-and-development projects in the
use of renewable resources for electrical gen-
eration in the Pacific Northwest. In the former
case, regional consumers would be helping to
repay the past subsidies they have received for
Federal power in the past. In the latter case,
regional consumers would be helping to fi-
nance their own conservation and electrical-
supply programs.
As long as the price charged for electric
power continues to be below the market-clear-
ing price, apparent "shortages" are going to
persist. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act will not pro-
vide an effective allocation mechanism, de-
spite its establishment of a conservation pro-
gram to reduce consumption. Consumers are
not likely to be convinced of the need to con-
serve when the price they pay fails to provide
proper signals regarding the true value of the
resources required to bring them additional
power. Efforts to shift available supplies
among competing groups will not solve the
fundamental problem of disequilibrium. The
only lasting solution is through higher prices.
Even with the sharp increase in power rates
implemented by Bonneville in early 1980 as a
result ofthe averaging in ofthe costs of sched-
uled thermal power, the agency's average price
for power still remains far below the long-run
incremental cost that would represent an effi-
cient use of society's scarce resources.v. Summary and Conclusions
Traditionally, the electric-power industry block of power to be acquired by Bonneville
has presumably been characterized by deereas- is far above the agency's reported average
ing long-run average costs over the output cost. This may reflect 1) Bonneville's failure to
range relevant to a given market. To permit recover the true average costs of the Federal
consumers to benefit from the assumed econ- system as determined on an opportunity-cost
omies of scale inherent in electricity genera- basis and 2) the failure of the utility industry's
tion, governments have granted private firms historical-cost accounting methods to fully re-
monopoly status to serve given markets under fleet the impact ofinflation. But it also may re-
regulated conditions. Social control also has fleet the exhaustion of economies of scale.
taken the form of public ownership of gener- Congress should remove legal budgetary re-
ation and transmission facilities. Regulatory straints to enable Bonneville to set the average
agencies, on the basis of this assumed charac- level of its rates equal to long-run incremental
teristic of decreasing long-run average costs, cost. By its sharp impact on power rates, that
also have prescribed the average-cost pricing approach should significantly reduce Pacific
method for setting the level of rates. Under Northwest electric-power consumption-and
such cost conditions, setting price equal to in- thereby reduce the need for many of the coal
cremental cost would result in a financial loss. and nuclear generating plants now scheduled
For a more efficient allocation of resources, for construction during the 1980's. Surplus rev-
Bonneville should base its power rates on long- enues could be returned to the U.S. Treasury
run incremental cost rather than average cost. or used for a loan program to foster regional
Moreover, the agency should follow a strict, electrical conservation and renewable electri-
rather than sub-optimal, approach to long-run cal-energy development programs. Legislation
incremental cost pricing. Average price per designed to re-allocate available supplies
unit should equal long-run incremental cost. among competing consumer groups will not
The result is efficient resource allocation, be- correct the basic disequilibrium between de-
cause rates then reflect the true cost of the re- mand and supply created by the average-cost
sources expended to provide consumers with pricing method. Instead, regulatory authorities
each additional block of power. must give increased emphasis to the role of
The long-run incremental cost of the next price as a balancing mechanism.
APPENDIX A:
Natural Monopoly and Utility Regulation
The electric-power industry traditionally has tions," so as to prevent the extraction of
been considered a "natural monopoly,"-an monopoly profits.
industry where free-market conditions alleg- Social control ofthese utilities has taken two
edly lead to a structure which is both monop- forms: 1) establishment of public regulatory
olistic and capable ofachieving lowest produc- authorities with power to investigate utility fi-
tion costs. Theorists argue that the technological nances and operations and to set "just and
conditions inherent in the generation and reasonable" rates; and 2) direct public own-
transmission ofelectricity favor the granting of ership of generation and transmission facili-
monopoly status to firms serving given market ties. On a nationwide basis, regulation of pri-
areas. Atthe same time, legal authorities claim vately-owned enterprises is the more common
that it is proper for government regulatory form of organization, but in the Pacific North-
commissions to regulate these "public utili- west, publicly-owned utilities play an impor-
ties," where monopoly is considered as "nat- tant role, sharing the retail market almost
ural" or inevitable due to "technical condi- equally with privately-owned utilities. Pub-
55licly-owned utilities not only own their own of fixed to variable costs. Effective utilization
generating plants, but also purchase wholesale of this equipment requires that the facilities be
power from the Bonneville Power Administra- operated as close to full capacity as possible,
tion. thus dividing the total fixed cost of those facil-
Legal justification for regulating certain pri- ities among the maximum number of units of
vately-owned business firms developed from output. Similarly, in this context, duplicate fa-
English common law, as modified in a series of cilities-such as would be present in the usual
landmark judicial decisions over the 1877-1943 competitive situation-would result in sub-
period?O These decisions determined the legal stantially higher unit costs. These characteris-
criteria for a public utility to be: 1) a business tics translate into short-run declining average
whose activities are essential to the public wel- costs. That is, once the investment in plant is
fare, i.e., in legal terms, "affected with a pub- made and plant size is fixed over the short-run,
lic interest;" and 2) one where regulation is average unit cost declines as output is ex-
required to protect the public. But economists panded.
have struggled for years to determine which Other economists have argued that the in-
characteristics qualify an industry as a natural cidence of heavy fixed costs is not a sufficient
monopoly and justify the granting of exclusive criterion for "natural monopoly." In industries
franchises under regulated conditions. with a heavy proportion of fixed to variable
Some have mentioned heavy fixed costs as costs, production may still be carried on effi-
a necessary prerequisite.
21 They point out that ciently by a large number of firms. Duplication
supplying electricity requires very costly capi- would be inefficient only in situations where
tal equipment, resulting in a high proportion there are economies of scale, or decreasing
Chart A.1
Pricing Alternatives in a Monopoly Situation
Price and Cost (Decreasing Long-Run Costs Over





Pm = Unregulated monopoly price under profit maximization
Pac = Regulated monopoly price under average-cost pricing
Pic = Regulated monopoly price under long-run incremental-cost pricing
56long-run average costs, over the entire extent
of the market. In such situations-but only in
such situations-it would be inefficient for
more than one producer to supply a given mar-
ket. According to these economists, economies
ofscale are the indispensible feature ofnatural
monopoly.22
Unregulated, the monopolist maximizes
profits by equating marginal revenue (MR) to
long-run incremental cost (LRIC) and pricing
at a level Pm which corresponds to an output
level Om (Appendix A, Chart I). Because price
per unit exceeds average cost per unit, the
monopolist enjoys a substantial economic
profit. Moreover, because price exceeds long-
runincremental cost-the cost ofthe last block
of production-there is an under-utilization of
resources, i.e., too few resources are devoted
to this product. This socially undesirable op-
tion is normally prevented through the regu-
latory process, with the adoption of an aver-
age-cost pricing method. This approach results
in a lower price, Pac, than the unregulated
monopoly price, Pm' Similarly, it results in an
output level, Oac, which is greater than the
unregulated monopoly level of output, Om' It
does not lead to as low a price and high an
output level as would exist if price were deter-
mined by the cost of production of the last
unit, that is, by the intersection of the demand
curve and the long-run incremental cost curve.
But under long-run decreasing average-cost
conditions, the result is a price, Pie, that fails
to cover average costs, so that without public




Five-Year Levelized Annual Costs, Washington Public Power Supply System
Nuclear Plants 1, 2, and 3
(cost data in thousands of dollars)
Present Present Value levelized
Fixed Variable Value of levelizing Annual
Year Cost
2 Cost
2 (Credits)3 Total Cost Factor' Total Costs FactorS Cost
WPPSS #2
1982
1 163,320 23,670 (-4,280) 182,710 .913 166,814
1983 164,860 25,190 ( 4,280) 185,770 .834 154,932
1984 167,940 27,440 ( 4,280) 191,100 .726 138,739
1985 169,690 30,410 (-4,280) 195,820 .696 136,291




1 192,550 37,750 (-4,910) 225,390 .913 205,781
1985 198,180 38,660 (-4,910) 231,930 .834 193,430
1986 200,170 42,830 (-4,910) 238,090 .726 172,853
1987 203,840 46,190 (-4,910) 245,120 .696 170,604




1 133,410 26,800 (-3,750) 156,460 .913 142,848
1987 132,540 29,700 ( 3,750) 158,490 .834 132,181
1988 133,420 33,180 ( 3,750) 162,850 .726 118,229
1989 134,340 34,930 (-3,750) 165,520 .696 115,202








1 Initial year of full operation.
2 Costs include expected increases in input prices.
3 Interest earnings on reserves.
4 Assumes a discount rate of 9.5 percent.
5 Levelizing factor = i/(I_vffi), where i = interest rate, m number of periods, and vffi = 1/(1 + i)ffi.
Source: Computed by the author on the basis of cost data provided by Bonneville Power Administration.
57APPENDIX C:
Adjustment of Bonneville's Reported Average Costs to Reflect Opportunity Costs
The following technical notes describe the
methodology used by the author to adjust
Bonneville's reported average unit costs for
the 1947-79 period to include the major cost
items and methodologies employed by private-
owned utilities. The reported and imputed
costs appear in Appendix C, Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.
Taxes: Annual property-tax payments were
imputed by applying the average property-tax
rate for the U.S. private-utility sector in any
given year to the Federal Columbia River
Power System's total electrical plant in service
as of that year, valued on an historical-cost
basis. Income-tax payments for the system
were imputed through a similar procedure, by
applying the income-tax rate for the U.S. pri-
vate-utility sector in any given year to the total
electric-power revenues received by FCRPS as
of that year.
Interest: Interest payments on an opportu-
nity-cost basis were imputed for any given year




Appendix C, Table 1
Federal Columbia River Power System Costs, 1947-79
As Reported by Bonneville
1
(cost data in millions of dollars)
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
Fiscal Operation & Purchase and Total Unit
Year Maintenance Exchange Power Total Interest Amortization
2 Total Costs Sales
3 Cost
4
1947 6.01 .34 6.35 5.16 10.38 15.54 21.89 8.26 265
1949 5.69 .74 6.43 5.86 15.53 21.39 27.82 11.97 .232
1951 8.11 .55 8.66 5.53 22.00 27.53 36.19 15.08 .240
1953 10.25 .76 lUll 9.34 18.60 27.94 38.95 16.39 .238
1955 12.01 .48 12.49 15.94 23.55 39.49 51.98 21.83 238
1957 15.34 .49 15.83 24.02 26.42 50.44 66.27 28.21 235
1959 18.39 .52 18.91 30.14 19.42 49.56 68.47 28.66 .239
1961 21.69 .70 22.39 32.82 14.49 47.31 69.70 28.28 .247
1963 23.17 1.28 24.45 34.63 18.62 53.25 77.70 31.49 .247
1965 27.05 1.62 28.67 35.22 26.22 61.44 90.11 37.20 .242
1967 28.98 9.64 38.62 35.55 38.66 74.21 112.83 43.99 .256
1969 34.09 12.53 46.62 43.32 47.34 90.66 137.28 51.88 265
1971 44.59 12.81 57.40 59.14 39.14 98.28 155.68 57.61 .270
1973 53.44 48.26 101.70 69.32 6.32 75.64 177.34 65.04 .273
1975 71.32 19.35 IW.02 89.18 37.95 127.13 237.15 65.73 .361
1977 94.79 23.72 118.51 118.49 - 13.41 105.08 223.59 61.75 .362
1979 123.15 25.20 148.35 168.00 19.79 148.21 296.56 72.02 .412
These costs reflect Bonneville's interpretation of its repayment responsibility. That is. they represent the amounts the
agency believes it must recover in the form of revenues during any given year to cover all the costs incurred by the Corps
of Engineers. the Bureau of Reclamation and the Bonneville Power Administration in purchasing. generating. transmit-
ting and marketing electric power. including the amortization of the Government's investment in power facilities with
interest. The repayment accounting method constitutes the basis for establishing the average power rate.
2 Amortization. unlike the other cost data. is not reported by Bonneville. Rather. it is a residual amount left over from
total revenues after all other costs have been subtracted. This policy arises from the agency's interpretation of its
repayment responsibility. Although it is required by law to repay in full all Congressional appropriations within fifty
years after the investment becomes revenue producing. Bonneville does not interpret this requirement to mean that it
must repay the borrowings on a straight-line or otherwise consistent basis. In fiscal years 1977 and 1979. total revenues
were insufficient to permit any repayment of debt to the U.S. Treasury.
3 In billions of kilowatt hours.
4 In cents per kilowatt hour. derived on the basis of the average-cost pricing method. Unit cost equals total cost divided
by the number of units (kwh) sold in a given period. Unit cost and average cost are thus synonymous under the average-
cost pricing procedure.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. Bonneville Power Administration. Annual Report (various issues) and Financial and
Statistical Summary.
58Appendix C, Table 2
Federal Columbia River Power System Costs, 1947-79,
As Imputed on a Private-Utility Cost Basis
1
(cost data in millions of dollars)
Variable Costs Fixed Costs
Purchase
and Reconciliation
Fiscal Operation & Exchange Property Income Deprec- Depreciation & Total Unit





6 Interest? Total Costs CostS -----
1947 6.01 .34 6.35 5.94 l.59 3.76 .75 5.49 17.53 23.88 .289
1949 5.69 .74 6.43 7.69 2.21 5.01 1.00 7.27 23.18 29.61 .247
1951 8.11 .55 8.66 10.36 4.23 6.80 1.36 9.89 32.64 41.30 .274
1953 10.25 .76 11.01 11.89 4.86 9.62 1.93 14.84 43.14 54.15 .330
1955 12.01 .48 12.49 20.28 6.24 15.86 3.18 25.39 70.95 83.44 .382
1957 15.34 .49 15.83 26.41 6.91 20.46 4.10 34.36 92.24 108m .383
1959 18.39 .52 18.91 32.44 6.43 23.91 4.79 41.20 108.77 127.68 .445
1961 21.69 .70 22.39 33.37 8.05 25.50 5.11 43.52 115.55 137.94 .488
1963 23.17 1.28 24.45 59.44 8.74 27.74 5.56 47.21 148.70 173.15 .550
1965 27.05 1.62 28.67 39.46 9.55 28.96 5.81 48.20 131.98 160.65 .432
1967 28.98 9.64 38.62 42.13 10.70 31.06 6.23 52.64 142.76 181.38 .412
1969 34.09 12.53 46.62 55.85 11.71 40.99 8.22 90.41 207.18 253.80 .489
1971 44.59 12.81 57.40 68.53 7.25 50.06 10.04 129.67 265.55 322.95 .561
1973 53.44 48.26 101.70 73.33 5.87 55.03 11.03 145.95 291.21 392.91 .604
1975 71.32 19.35 90.67 98.59 5.22 70.50 14.13 221.82 410.26 500.93 .762
1977 94.79 23.72 118.51 In.08 3.58 85.44 17.13 286.44 515.67 634.18 1.027
1979 123.15 25.20 148.35 134.66 5.25 95.87 19.22 329.79 584.80 733.15 1.018
These costs represent the author's interpretation of the amounts that should have been recovered by Bonneville in the
form of revenues in any year had it been operating as a private investor-owned electric utility. These consist of the
variable costs as actually measured and reported by Bonneville, plus recomputations of fixed costs to include imputed
property and income-tax payments, interest charges reflecting the opportunity cost of capital in the private-utility sector,
and a straight-line depreciation and amortization charge to repay all outstanding debt on a consistent and continuous
basis.
2 The author took no exception to total system variable costs as measured by Bonneville. Variable costs are thus as
reported in Appendix C, Table I.
3 Derived by applying the average property-tax rate for the U.S. private-utility sector in any given year (property taxes
paid as a percentage of total electric plant) to the Federal Columbia River Power System's (FCRPS's) total elcctric plant
in service as of that year.
4 Derived by applying the average income-tax rate for the U.S. private-utility sector in any given year (Federal and other
income taxes paid as a percentage of total revenues) to the total electric-power revenues received by the Federal
Columbia River Power System as of that year. Income tax is considered a flxed cost by private investor-owned utilities
in that some payment is assured by the regulatory process.
5 Private utilities recover their long-term borrowings for capital investment through their depreciation charges. Depreciation
is usually calculated on a straight-line basis, by applying the average life of service of the equipment to the total value
of the plant in service, measured on a historical (original) cost basis as is customary in the private-utility industry.
Bonneville estimates the average service life of its plant to be 60 years. For any given year, depreciation thus has been
calculated here as 1/60th of the total value of the plant in service, measured on an historical-cost basis.
6 Depreciation is calculated on an average 60-year basis, whereas Bonneville is required by law to amortize (pay back) its
borrowings within 50 years after they become revenue producing. The "reconciliation" charges represent the difference
between IIS0th and 1I60th of the value of plant in service.
7 Derived on an "opportunity cost.. basis; total interest payments in each year equal the product of new debt and the
current Moody's average Aaa interest rate for public (private investor-owned) utilities, plus the product of old unamor-
tized debt and the interest rate in effect when that debt was incurred. Debt is reduced (amortized) on a straight-line basis
by 1I50th each year after it is incurred. A consistent series showing Congressional appropriations to the FCRPS was not
available. lotal value of plant in service was used as a proxy in determining outstanding debt, under the assumption that
borrowing was for capital investment.
8 In cents per kilowatt hour, derived on the basis of the average-cost pricing method. Unit cost equals total cost divided
by the number of units (kwh) sold in a given period. Unit cost and average cost are thus synonymous under the average-
cost pricing procedure.
Source: For data pertaining to the private-utility sector: Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately-Owned Electric
Utilities in the United States and Moody's Investors Services, Moody's Public Utilities Manual. For reported data pertaining
to the Federal Columbia River Power System: Bonneville Power Administration.
59where: P" = total interest payment in
year n
ly Moody's Aaa interest
rate on public (private
investor) utility issues in
year y
A y unamortized portion of
appropriations received
in year y as of year n
This formula simply states that total interest
payments in any given year, P", equal the sum
ofall interest payments on outstanding FCRPS
debt in that year. In other words, total interest
payments equal new debt times the prevailing
interest rate, plus any unamortized old debt
multiplied by the rate(s) in effect when the
debt was incurred. The first debt was assumed
to be incurred in 1939, the earliest date for
which data were available. Each increment in
debt was amortized on a straight-line basis by
1/50 each year after it was incurred, in line
with the 50-year payback period specified by
law. Note that Moody's Investor Service refers
to private investor-owned utilities as public
utilities, using that term in a general sense.
A consistent series showing annual Congres-
sional appropriations to the FCRPS was not
available. A proxy for "new debt" was devel-
oped by taking the total value of plant in ser-
vice; i.e., the capital stock, and calculating the
annual change, or new investment added each
year. That proxy was used under the assump-
tion that borrowing was for capital investment.
Amortization: Amortization costs were im-
puted annually for the 1947-79 period by de-
veloping a systematic straight-line depreciation
schedule. Depreciation was calculated by ap-
plying the average life of service of the equip-
ment to the total value of the plant in service,
measured on an historical (original) cost basis.
This amortization procedure follows that used
by most private utilities. Bonneville estimates
the average service life of its plant and equip-
ment to be 60 years. For any given year, de-
preciation thus was calculated as 1I60th of the
total value of plant in service. Since deprecia-
tion is calculated on a 6O-year basis, whereas
Bonneville is required by law to amortize bor-
rowings within 50 years, depreciation charges
thus calculated would fall short of meeting
Bonneville's repayment responsibilities. A rec-
onciliation charge therefore was calculated,
representing the difference between 1I50th and
1I60th of the value ofthe plant in service. (The
fact that transmission investment must be paid
back in 40 rather than 50 years was ignored,
i.e., the payment period was assumed to be 50
years, the same as for generating investment.)
FOOTNOTES
1. Perhaps the most widely-used source is the long-term
forecast of Pacific Northwest electric-energy loads and
resources developed annually by the region's utilities. For
a summary of the latest findings, see U.S. Department of
Energy, Bonneville Power Administration, Power Outlook
Through 1989-90 (Portland: Bonneville Power Adminis-
tration, May 1979). Bonneville's marketing area includes
Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Western Montana.
2. For a description of the average-cost pricing method-
ology followed by private investor-owned utilities in estab-
lishing the level of rates, see Edison Electric Institute,
Economic Growth In the Future: The Growth Debate
in National and Global Perspective (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 259-266.
3. For Bonneville, the return on invested capital includes
interest to be paid to the U.S. Treasury for long-term
borrowings for investment in the Federal Columbia River
Power System. These funds are acquired through
Congressional appropriation and, for financing transmis-
sion facilities, through the sale of revenue bonds to the
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Treasury. For private investor-owned utilities, the return
consists of three components: 1) interest payments on
bonded indebtedness, 2) dividends on preferred stock,
and 3) a return to common-equity holders, a residual
amount which becomes available to these owners only
after all other legitimate claims of the company have been
settled. The first two are specified exactly on the bond
indenture and the preferred-stock certificates.
4. In a perfect-competition model, there is one situation in
which short and long-run marginal (incremental) costs are
equal-that is, in long-run competitive equilibrium. In this
situation, plant capacity has been adjusted to its optimum
size for achieving a given level of output, as shown in
Chart 2 at output Q3. It is assumed that a firm starts from
scratch in planning its optimal-size production facility. In
reality, this optimum is never realized. Instead, firms op-
erate with plants of various ages, and must make deci-
sions with regard to adding new capacity, either for re-
placement or growth purposes. Pricing on the basis of
short-run costs would not necessarily recover the capital
costs associated with this new plant.With regard to the distinction between marginal and incre-
mental cost, marginal cost-strictly speaking-refers to
the additional cost of supplying a single, infinitesimally
small additional amount. Incremental cost refers to the
average additional cost of a larger finite addition to pro-
duction. Since rate changes are relatively infrequent, ad-
ditions to output for which costs must be recovered are of
an incremental rather than marginal magnitude.
5. For proof that marginal-cost pricing of all goods and
services leads to optimum welfare, see Edward Berlin,
Charles J. Cicchetti and William J. Gillen, Perspective on
Power, A Study of the Regulation and Pricing of Elec-
tric Power, A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the
Ford Foundation (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Com-
pany, 1975), pp. 127-130.
6, The cost curves for an individual firm are drawn under
the assumption that the firm has no influence on the prices
of the factors of production it uses. Internal economies
therefore are those enjoyed by a firm apart from any
change in factor prices. When an industry as a whole
expands its output, the prices of factor inputs may be
affected. External economies affect the slope of the in-
dustry supply curve.
7. For a discussion of the distinction between economies
of scale, i.e., decreasing long-run average costs, and de-
creasing short-run average costs attributable to spreading
of overhead, see Edward Berlin, Charles J. Cicchetti and
William J. Gillen, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
8. There are numerous studies devoted to the methodol-
ogies for determining long-run incremental costs and rates
in the electric-utility industry. See, for example, Charles R.
Cicchetti, William G. Gillen and Paul Smolensky, The Mar-
ginal Cost and Pricing of Electricity: An Appiied Ap-
proach (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1977); Charles R. Scherer, Estimating Electric Power
System Marginal Costs (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 1977); National Economic Research
Associates, Inc., A Framework for Marginal Cost-Based
Time-Differentiated Pricing in the United States, Topic
1.3, prepared for Electric Utility Rate Design Study (New
York: National Economic Research Associates, Inc.,
1977); and Ralph Turvey, Optimal Pricing and Invest-
ment in Electricity Supply, An Essay in Applied Wel-
fare Economics (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1968). All of these studies are inordinately
complex because they deal not only with the level of rates,
but also with the structure, and the time and seasonal
differentiation of rates.
9. According to Bonneville, thermal capacity will account
for 92 percent of the total new generation name-plate
capacity scheduled for the 1978-86 period. See U.S. De-
partment of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration,
BPA long-run Incremental Cost of Service and Rate
Study (Portland: Bonneville Power Administration, July
1979), Table 4. The author did not accept BPA's calcula-
tions of long-run incremental thermal and hydro-power
costs, but did take into consideration that the agency's
incremental-cost estimate for hydro-peaking capacity was
far lower than its estimate for baseload thermal energy.
10. The legal requirement to recover costs is found in
Section 7 of the Bonneville Project Act (50 Stat. 731,
approved August 20, 1937); Section 5 of the Flood Control
Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 887), which applies to the marketing
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of power from all Corps of Engineers' projects; and Sec-
tion 9 of the Federal Columbia River Transmission Act
(approved October 18,1974; 88 Stat. 1376). See Bonne-
ville Power Administration, The Role of the Bonneville
Power Administration in the Pacific Northwest Power
Supply System, op. cit., Appendix C, pp. 11-34-38.
11. Bonneville Power Administration, The Role of the
Bonneville Power Administration in the Pacific North-
west Power Supply System, ibid., Appendix C, p. 11-9.
12. Major cost items were included only if appropriate. For
example, the return to equity owners was excluded be-
cause Bonneville is financed solely through Congressional
appropriations and sales of revenue bonds to the U.S.
Treasury.
13. Bonneville Power Administration, Interest Rate Policy
(Unpublished paper, February 15, 1978), p. 5.
14. See Edison Electric Institute, A StUdy of the Bonne-
ville Power Administration, The Marketing Agent for
the U.S. Columbia River Power System (New York:
Edison Electric Institute, 1963), p. 2; and David L. Shapiro,
"Bonneville Agency Pricing and Electric Power Utiliza-
tion," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business
(Winter 1976), p. 22. In these studies, the opportunity-cost
principle for selecting the appropriate interest rate was not
discussed.
15. Since Bonneville purchases power only from publicly-
owned utilities, the sale of long-term bonds is the only
method of funding. For private utilities, the return on equity
capital is adjusted for inflation, since the regulatory process
permits the return on old equity to equal the rate of return
on new equity. However, this adjustment pertains only to
the return on equity capital.
16. Numerous utility experts have noted the increased
maintenance problems and higher forced outage rates
associated with nuclear plants above about 600 MW ca-
pacity. See, for example, C, C. Boone, "The Financial
Impact of Outages," paper presented at 31st Annual
Meeting of the American Power Conference, April 1969;
also, Louis H. Roddis, Jr., "Address to the 1972 Atomic
Industrial Forum."
17. Since electricity is crucial to the aluminum industry-
by far Bonneville's largest industrial user-and is presently
priced very low relative to other regions, the industrial
sector's demand schedule may be less elastic than that
of the utility sector. If so, industrial users would pay less
for power under the inverse elasticity rule than utility cus-
tomers, although both groups would pay far more than
they are paying under current average-cost pricing meth-
ods. Since industrial customers are Willing to take acertain
amount of interruptible power, that differential might be
acceptable to all parties.
18. Strict long-run incremental-cost pricing also would
eliminate the need for the preference clause, because
with overall consumption declining, sufficient resources
would be available to meet the quantity demanded by all
customer groups.
19. See J. W. Wilson, "Residential Demand for Electricity,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business (No-
vember 1979), pp. 7-22; K. P. Anderson, "The Demand
for Electricity: Econometric Estimate for California and the
United States," RAND R-90S-NSF, Santa Monica, Cali-fomia, 1972; R. Halvorsen, "Residential Electricity: De-
mand and Supply," presented at the Sierra Club Confer-
ence on Power and Public Policy, Vermont, January 1972.
20. For a summary of the constitutional history and the
criteria for regulation, see Alfred E. Kahn, op. cit., pp. 3-
8; also, Dexter Merriam Keezer and Stacy May, The Pub-
lic Control of Business (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1930), Chapter 5.
21. Ely observed, for example, that natural monopolies
will exist in the presence of the following three conditions:
a high degree of price sensitivity by consumers, the tech-
nical and economical impracticality of a large number of
producers, and a high proportion of fixed to variable costs.
Clemens, many years later, listed the following necessary
conditions: conditions of space and geography, large cap-
ital investments, economies of decreasing costs, technical
limitations of the market, and exclusive franchises. Rich-
ard T. Ely, Outlines of Economics, 6th Ed. (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1937), p. 628, Eli W. Clemens, Eco-
nomics and Public Utilities (New York: Appleton-Cen-
tury-Crofts, Inc., 1950), pp. 26-28.
22. For example, Kahn, in his analysis of natural monop-
oly, emphasizes that it is not the fact of "duplication alone
that makes for natural monopoly, but the presence of
economies of scale or decreasing costs in the provision
and utilization of their facilities," and that this will be the
case only "when the economies achievable by larger out-
put are internal to the individual firm." See Kahn, op. cit.,
Vol 2, pp. 119 and 121.
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